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Abstract: 
The success of the extreme right in France in the past two decades has not been limited to 
their electoral rise; a more long-lasting victory has taken place in the ideological field, where 
the discourse of the extreme right occupies now a prominent place in the mainstream 
liberal democratic agenda. Increasingly, their ideas are seen in the media and within the 
ranks of mainstream parties as ‘common sense’, or at least acceptable. 
The growing acceptance of this ‘common sense’ is the result of very carefully crafted 
strategies put in place by extreme right thinkers since the 1980s. For over three decades 
now, in order to change perceptions and renew extreme right-wing ideology, New Right 
thinktanks such as the French GRECE believed it was necessary to borrow the tactics of the 
left, and more specifically the Gramscian concept of hegemony: cultural power must 
precede political power. With the use of contemporary examples, this article will 
demonstrate the continuing impact these ideas have had on the Front National and French 
politics and society, and how this change has originated in the association of populist 
rhetoric with the neo-racist stigmatisation of an ‘Other’.  
Keywords: extreme right, front national, populism, neo-racism, Marine Le Pen, 
Islamophobia, same-sex marriage, Nouvelle Droite, hegemony 
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The extreme right, the Republic and the battle for hegemony  
(6925 words) 
 
Introduction: From pariah to respectable candidate 
Many commentators have argued that the 2002 French presidential elections, in 
which Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round, were an earthquake in French politics. 
Panic filled the air and the French took to the streets to demonstrate against the infamous 
Front National (FN), described by protesters as F for Fascist and N for Nazi. This comparison 
with fascism and Nazism was inaccurate, possibly even counterproductive, as shall be 
discussed in this article. Yet the strong reaction, initially only of part of the French 
population, but of the broader electorate during the second round, demonstrated that 
France was not yet ready to accept the FN as a normal contender. Indeed, after voters went 
to the polls for the traditional second-round face-off, Jacques Chirac, for whom only 13.75 
per cent of those registered had voted in the first round, was elected with over 82 per cent 
of the vote, leaving Jean-Marie Le Pen with only a marginal increase on his dramatic first 
round. Once the dust had settled, a cold-headed analysis demonstrated that the FN’s result 
did not mean an electoral breakthrough for Le Pen, but rather that the mainstream parties 
who had been leading French affairs since the Second World War now failed to appeal to 
voters. In terms of share of the votes, the FN made very little ground on its 1988 and 1995 
results, while the vote gathered by the mainstream right and left dropped from 70.61 per 
cent in 1988 to 42.9 per cent in 2002, and their share of registered voters from 56.29 per 
cent to 29.67 per cent. While marginal parties on the left benefited from the protest vote, 
abstention was the real ‘winner’, reaching 28.4 per cent in the major French election. Yet in 
all this, all that would be remembered was the Le Pen ‘earthquake’. Thirty years after its 
creation, the FN received a welcome boost in its hegemonic struggle, aided by the growing 
disillusionment of the population with parliamentary politics.2 Fear campaigns waged by 
both the moderate left and right in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the complicity of the 
                                                     
2 Céline Braconnier and Jean-Yves Dormagen, La Démocratie De L'abstention; Aux Origines De La 
Démobilisation Electorale En Milieu Populaire, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2007). 
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media, who played a major part in legitimising the distrust of a particular kind of 
immigration,3 made the Muslim community into the perfect scapegoat.  
Ten years on, the 2012 presidential elections provided a convincing benchmark for 
the progress of the FN in its quest for cultural hegemony. Within a decade, France had 
witnessed the seemingly irresistible rise to power of Nicolas Sarkozy, and the advent of an 
‘unabashed’ right, willing to break taboos and unleash the prejudice which had built up 
under the dictatorship of political correctness. Sarkozy’s open courting of the FN electorate 
was undeniably successful at first. Aided by the wounds of 2002, he won the 2007 
presidential elections in a landslide, with many voters turning away from their protest vote 
for the FN or the extreme left, and migrating back to the moderate parties.4 For a time, 
some of those who had turned to Jean-Marie Le Pen to express their frustration at the 
current situation, (re)turned to the more moderate right, and found in Sarkozy a man who 
promised to break away from the old ways and accommodate their exaggerated fears. The 
FN seemed to have lost its originality, and for some commentators, this was the beginning 
of the end for Le Pen’s party. France had triumphed over the extreme right and there 
seemed little the old leader could do to change the tide. Yet strikingly, on the night of the 
first round of the 2007 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen declared that her father’s 
disappointing result did not mark the end of the FN, but that the campaign marked ‘the 
victory of its ideas’.5 With the Global Financial Crisis and the ‘hyper-president’s’ inability to 
deliver much of his right-wing populist promises, with rising unemployment and the 
promotion within the media and politics of a divisive and exaggerated vision of society 
where the ‘other’ was increasingly menacing and Islam ever more virulent, the stage was set 
for Marine Le Pen, the FN’s new president. In this context, it was therefore expected that Le 
Pen would poll well, and yet her performance went beyond most predictions as she 
gathered almost 1 million more votes than her father’s best. 
This article does not concentrate on Marine Le Pen’s breakthrough per se, but 
instead goes deeper into the factors which made the FN so popular and, more importantly, 
acceptable in 2012. The aim of this article is to explain how and why the FN has become a 
                                                     
3 Thomas Deltombe, L'islam Imaginaire : La Construction Mediatique De L'islamophobie En France, 1975-2005, 
(Paris: La Decouverte, 2005). 
4 Aurelien Mondon, 'Nicolas Sakozy's Legitimisation of the Front National: Background and Perspectives', 
Patterns of Prejudice, vol.47, no.1,  2013, 22-40. Translations from the French, unless otherwise stated, are by 
the author. 
5 Marine  Le Pen, Interview in +Clair, Canal +, 22 April 2007. 
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serious contender in contemporary French politics, reaping the benefits of decades of right-
wing Gramscist struggle for hegemony. By first highlighting the process by which the French 
extreme right reconstructed itself in the second part of the twentieth century, this article 
demonstrates that Marine Le Pen’s rise in the polls was not simply due to a change of style 
and leadership, but to a deeper realignment of elite discourse over the past three decades. 
The focus of this article is therefore elite discourse, and more importantly its reception and 
impact, as the aim is to gauge the way in which ideas recently considered unacceptable 
have become the norm in the new millennium. Through a critical discourse analysis of 
political speeches and media articles tracing this evolution, this article stresses that the 
extreme right’s key strength was not primarily its programme, but a changing society where 
its exclusivist rhetoric has become increasingly accepted. After covering the essential 
historical development of this hegemonic shift, this article provides an analysis of the tools 
which have allowed the FN to help redefine key concepts in French politics. It goes on to 
study the ways in which the FN has adapted its strategy through the use of neo-racism and 
populism to remove the stigma from its origins, and transform itself into the democratic 
alternative against all odds. In the final part, the concept of secularism and its evolution in 
recent years are used to illustrate this shift, by highlighting the elite reaction to two 
illuminating cases: the hijab and burqa ‘affairs’ and the Mariage pour Tous demonstrations.  
1. The origins of the FN’s hegemonic struggle 
While Marine Le Pen’s 2012 breakthrough was clearly facilitated by the context in 
France at the time, it would be wrong to assume that it was merely the state of the 
economy or the distrust and disappointment in mainstream politics which convinced over 
six million voters to choose the FN. Disillusionment in politics is not a new phenomenon in 
France and has grown constantly for decades, as demonstrated by the steady rise in 
abstention in most elections.6 As argued earlier, it was in fact this disconnect from politics 
from a growing part of the population which precipitated Jean-Marie Le Pen to the second 
round of the 2002 presidential elections, rather than an increase in his popularity. For his 
daughter, it is impossible to deny that beyond the failure of her mainstream competitors to 
convince the electorate, it was a real achievement to obtain over 6.4 million. However, 
while the new leadership certainly convinced some that the party had changed, a much 
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deeper evolution had taken place within French politics, one which started with the 
Nouvelle droite in the 1980s, and allowed for the eventual resurgence and acceptance of 
the FN as a normal contender within the French political landscape. While the early 
influence has been covered comprehensively by the seminal work of Pierre-Andre Taguieff 
in his 1994 Sur la Nouvelle droite: Jalons d’une analyse critique,7 and its theoretical 
contribution outlined in detail by Tamir Bar-On recently,8 it is essential to return briefly to 
the impact of Nouvelle droite thinkers on Le Pens’ party.   
Marine Le Pen’s result seemed an unlikely prediction in 1972, when the FN was 
created by neo-fascist Ordre Nouveau to regroup a disbanded and electorally insignificant 
extreme right under one umbrella. From the beginning, the leadership was given to Jean-
Marie Le Pen, whose credentials appeared both more moderate and more serious than 
those of the Ordre Nouveau leaders. Le Pen was an experienced politician, and had been 
part of many extreme right organisations and movements. As Jean-Pierre Rioux has pointed 
out, Le Pen ‘had the gift of always being visible during important events and always showing 
his skills as orator and organiser whenever necessary’.9  However, after the failure of 
Poujadism, the crumbling of the empire, the scars of the Algerian war and the poor 1965 
performance of Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, for whom Le Pen ran the campaign, it was the 
events of May ’68 which provided him with his first taste of Gramscist political strategy, as 
he realised that ‘what famous generals and hundreds of thousands of pieds-noirs could not 
do, shake the throne, three thousand students uttering inanities through the voice of Cohn-
Bendit, who isn’t even French, did’.10 While he was then most likely unaware of Gramsci’s 
theory, Le Pen already recognised that power had to be won through ideas and society, 
rather than by force. This translated into the FN’s first programme: ‘In defence of the 
French’, whose sole aim was the channelling of the protest vote.11 
It took ten years to mark the first success of the FN in the early phase of its 
hegemonic struggle. This first breakthrough took place soon after the its first positive 
                                                     
7 Pierre-André Taguieff, Sur La Nouvelle Droite: Jalons D'une Analyse Critique, (Paris: Descartes et Cie, 1994). 
8 Tamir Bar-On, Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to Modernity (London and New York: Routledge 
2013).   
9 Jean-Pierre Rioux, 'Des Clandestins Aux Activistes (1945-1965)', in Michel  Winock (ed.), Histoire De L'extrême 
Droite En France (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1994), 1 vol. (324 ), p.240. 
10 in Harvey G. Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1996), p.58. 
11 Erwan Lecoeur, Un Néo-Populisme À La Française: Trente Ans De Front National, (Paris: La Découverte, 
2003), p.35. 
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electoral results in Dreux. However, more than its own electoral appeal, it was the Socialist 
government which provided the FN with the help it needed to achieve national status. 
Facing bleak forecasts for the municipal elections, and seeing in the FN a possible enemy of 
the moderate right, François Mitterrand responded swiftly to Le Pen’s concerns on the lack 
of media coverage of his party, facilitating his appearance on prime-time television, while 
the extreme left remained ignored by the media.12 The FN’s ideas were given an importance 
and legitimacy that those of other minor parties were not; as a result, from 1983, moderate 
right politicians increasingly started borrowing its anti-immigrant propaganda.13 The Socialist 
Party would go even further in its legitimisation of the FN by implementing proportional 
voting for the 1986 elections, leading to the election of 35 FN deputies, and more 
importantly to the migration of many moderate right-wing politicians to Le Pen’s party, 
where they believed their electoral prospects to be better. By the mid-1980s, the FN 
obtained as many votes as the Communist Party. It was also at that time that the party 
began to be influenced and even infiltrated by Nouvelle Droite (New Right) thinkers. Born 
out of the May ’68 events, the Groupement de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation 
Européenne (European Civilisation Study and Research Group – GRECE) was the most 
theoretically sophisticated of these, and aimed to elaborate ‘an ideological corpus as 
coherent as possible’, a ‘Nouvelle Droite culture’ leading to the creation of a new world 
view.14 In order to change perceptions and renew right-wing ideology, GRECE believed it was 
necessary to borrow the successful tactics of the left and more specifically the Gramscist 
concept of hegemony.15 To achieve such goals, GRECE worked at the creation of a ‘counter-
cultural power’. For Simmons, the think tank’s position was that ‘the ability to determine 
the ‘taken for granted’ beliefs of the ordinary citizens was the ability to control society 
itself’.16 While initially a strong believer in racial inequalities and the racial superiority of the 
European civilisation, GRECE eventually opted for ‘the right to difference’. As a result, anti-
Semitic and racist vocabulary was replaced by the vocabulary of difference, people and 
                                                     
12 Emmanuel Faux, Thomas Legrand, and Gilles Perez, La Main Droite De Dieu; Enquête Sur François Mitterrand 
Et L'extrême Droite, (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1994), p.25. 
13 Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, p.74. 
14 Alain de Benoist and Pierre Vial in Ariane Chebel D'appollonia, L'extrême-Droite En France De Maurras À Le 
Pen, (Bruxelles [Evry]: Ed. Complexe, 1996), p.320. 
15 Alain De Benoist, 'Pour Un "Gramscisme De Droite"', Eléments, vol. 20,  1977, Alain  De Benoist, 'Une Droite 
Qui Soit À La Fois Et La Droite Et La Gauche', ibid.vol. 24-25,  1977-1978. 
16 Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, p.210. 
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culture, what Pierre-André Taguieff called ‘cultural differentialism’.17 In a perverse twist, de 
Benoist conflated colonisation and immigration: both sought to impose one race upon 
another. The cycle was complete once the Nouvelle Droite was able to portray itself as the 
only really tolerant group against the intolerant internationalists: de Benoist grandiloquently 
argued that he was ‘ready to defend [his] difference and, with an equal ardour, that of 
immigrants’,18 and fight against the ‘totalitarianism of egalitarianism’.19 In this, French neo-
racism was born and an ideological struggle based on Gramscist theories was launched to 
shift the political spectrum to the right. 
Even though the GRECE influenced the party, it officially avoided the FN. It is another 
Nouvelle droite think-tank, the Club de l'Horloge, that played an active part in reinvigorating 
the party’s strategy and made the FN increasingly acceptable for a more moderate 
electorate. Extreme right measures and ideological tenets became hidden under a veneer of 
softer rhetoric; the concepts of invasion, conspiracy and violence remained omnipresent 
throughout the programme, but were camouflaged by apparently positive or at least non-
threatening labels. For prominent horloger Bruno Mégret, attempts at infiltrating moderate 
politics with extreme right concepts were part of the ‘vocabulary battle’ against the left’s 
hegemony. From then on, the FN would strive to substitute Marxist and human rights 
vocabulary with its own in order to spread its vision. The Club de l’Horloge claimed that in 
1986 the FN’s ideas had already infiltrated the moderate right’s programme, as the Club de 
l’Horloge found only 14 points of contention between the moderate and extreme right 
manifestoes in the mid-1980s.20 Moreover, while Jacques Chirac remained a strong 
opponent of any partnership with the extreme right, he appointed hard-right Charles 
Pasqua and traditionalist Philippe de Villiers respectively minister of the interior and state 
secretary to the minister of culture. These nominations were a clear signal to Le Pen’s 
electorate that the moderate right was willing to take their discontent into account.21 
Le Pen’s positive result in the 1988 presidential elections – with 4.3 million of the 
vote – confirmed that the party was heading in the right direction: 
                                                     
17 Pierre-André Taguieff, Sur La Nouvelle Droite: Jalons D'une Analyse Critique. 
18 in Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, p.214. 
19 Alain De Benoist, Les Idées À L'endroit, (Paris: Editions Libre-Hallier, 1979), p.145-56. 
20 Yvan Blot, 'L'union De La Droite Est-Il Possible?', (Club de L'Horloge, 1989). 
21 Mathias Bernard, La Guerre Des Droites, De L'affaire Dreyfus À Nos Jours, (Paris: Odile Jacob Histoire, 2007), 
p.206. 
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today, the power of words has changed sides: now one hears the man on the street, 
politicians, and journalists situate themselves, in spite of themselves, in the problematic of 
the national movement when talking about ‘identity’, ‘Lebanonisation’, ‘politico-media 
class’, and more and more about the ‘establishment’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, the ‘people’, and 
‘hidden totalitarianism’.22 
The FN, under Mégretist influence, crafted a new programme: ‘The National 
Alternative: 300 measures for the rebirth of France’.23 The choice offered to the French was 
clear and simple: ‘civilisation or barbarism’, ‘national values or globalist ideology’. The old 
communist foe was no longer the main target. Instead, the party moved towards more 
rewarding enemies in the ‘end of history’ context: globalisation (mondialisme) and human 
rights, which threatened to destroy national identities. The new programme also 
exemplified their populist shift. Neo-liberal ideals, which became widely resented as the 
recession and unemployment hit France, were buried deep in the programme, and the most 
potent themes became protectionism and anti-Europeanism.24 A social rhetorical veneer 
was applied to the most reactionary measures and, in hindsight, this programme 
represented something of a transition from Maurrassism to Sarkozism. The programme was 
apocalyptic in its portrayal of the future, reinforcing the necessity of a strong reaction, a 
rupture. Populism was central: France’s fate was bleak because the ‘mondialiste ideology’ 
had ‘contaminated’ the political establishment; yet there was hope in the people, ‘whose 
common sense’ remained intact.25 In order to please the many faces of its electorate, the FN 
had to offer a simultaneous increase and decrease in the role of the state. Such a 
paradoxical proposal was directly in line with what the extreme right had offered during the 
interwar period: the dismantling of the social elements of the state, yet the reinforcement 
of the state in its repressive function, measures taken in the name of both ‘liberties’ and 
‘security’.  
While the party continued to evolve, and despite the 1998 departure of those who 
had played a key role in precipitating the change, the shift which took place with the 300 
measures programme remains a cornerstone in the evolution of the party, as it marked the 
new-found reliance on both neo-racism and populism. Their use in the process of 
                                                     
22 in Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, p.218. 
23 Front National, 300 Mesures Pour La Renaissance De La France L'alternative Nationale Programme De 
Gouvernement, (Saint-Cloud: Ed. nationales, 1993). 
24 Steve Bastow, 'Front National Economic Policy: From Neo-Liberalism to Protectionism', Modern & 
Contemporary France, vol. 5, no.1 1997, p.61-72. 
25 Front National, 300 Mesures Pour La Renaissance De La France L'alternative Nationale Programme De 
Gouvernement. 
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legitimisation of the party were crucial in the results obtained by Marine Le Pen in 2012, for 
they allowed the party to shake off the demons of its past, and its ideas to shape politics 
beyond the party’s boundaries.  
2. The perfect storm – Populism and Neo-Racism as alternatives in times of crisis 
a. The pseudo-democratic outsider – the populist illusion 
More than the economic crisis itself, it could be argued that it is the crisis of 
liberalism and politics which has facilitated the resurgence of ideas such as those promoted 
by the FN. After the early excitement generated by the ‘end of history’ thesis, it has become 
clear that the emancipatory character of the liberal hegemony was limited. The ever-
increasing reliance on economic rationalism, and its proportionate impact on political 
powerlessness and community disengagement, appears to leave little space for the people 
and hopes of a better future for all.26 With the extreme left in shambles and social 
democrats seemingly unable to protect growing parts of the population left to fend for 
themselves in the neo-liberal order, disillusion with politics has become widespread. Many 
of those who have chosen not to join the ranks of abstention, and instead through their 
vote express their continued, albeit disappointed support for electoral politics, turned to the 
only party who could claim to have ‘clean hands’. The FN has been the only major party able 
to state not to have participated in government, and could therefore lay the blame for the 
situation on all its opponents, particularly those it called the ‘UMPS’ (UMP + PS). With the 
growing distrust in political parties, this has proved to be an incredible strength, as it has 
made the FN a visible and ‘novel’ option on the political spectrum, offering real change and 
hope. No matter how flawed, this alternative has been appealing precisely because it has 
been the only one. The FN finds its appeal in the growing section of the population that 
suffers ‘from the inability to give meaning to life and to the world’ and ‘from the loss of 
collective and individual identity’27 which can be argued, following Chantal Mouffe,28 to have 
been caused by the feeling of uselessness in the ‘post-political’ democratic machinery. The 
success of right-wing populism has then been the direct consequence of the death of 
alternative ideologies, Castoriadis’ ‘second disenchantment of the world’: ‘liberal progress 
                                                     
26 Wendy Brown, 'We Are All Democrats Now...', in Giorgio Agamben et al. (eds.), Democracy in What State? 
(New Directions in Critical Theory) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
27 Lecoeur, Un Néo-Populisme À La Française: Trente Ans De Front National p.184. 
28 Chantal Mouffe, 'The ‘End of Politics’ and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism', in Francisco Panizza (ed.), 
Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London ; New York: Verso, 2005) 
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appeared to part of the population as emptied of any meaning, while the communist was 
represented as a form of hell’.29 
In the context of the crisis, with the inability of the UMP to resolve rising 
unemployment and with little trust in the moderate Socialist campaign, Le Pen pushed the 
FN’s populist strategy in the 2012 campaign further. After five years of legitimisation of her 
populist rhetoric under Sarkozy’s presidency, convincing those who felt betrayed by the 
‘establishment’ remained one of the main focuses of her campaign. Le Pen was the ‘anti-
system’ candidate, standing alone against corrupt politicians and biased media.30 She 
proudly admitted to being a ‘populist’: 
a word used by the elite to express their disdain of the people, their worries and aspirations. 
In France, the people suffer the decisions of their leaders. They have been the great 
forgotten of the past thirty years. Yet democracy is the government of the people, by the 
people and for the people. If this is being populist, then I am a populist.31 
The strength of this message lay in the word ‘peuple’, whose singular form 
reinforced Le Pen’s assertion that she was the defender of one people against division, 
defender of France itself. Le Pen was also the candidate of the weak, ‘the candidate of the 
forgotten’, of the ‘invisible’, those ‘who don’t complain, those who cannot be seen, those 
we don’t want to listen to’.32 In the last days of the campaign, she stressed that she talked 
only to ‘real people’ about ‘real life’.33 Echoing traditional fascist movements, Marine Le Pen 
presented herself as the ‘neither left nor right’ candidate, the candidate beyond corruption, 
the outsider, the exact same embodiment her father and Sarkozy had successfully managed 
in the past. While it is commonly agreed that key to the extreme right’s return to the 
forefront of politics has been populism,34 it is crucial that the concept be understood here as 
a political style void of ideological content.35 This means that the Le Pens’ claim that they 
                                                     
29 Cornelius Castoriadis and Roger-Pol Droit, 'Entretien', in Roger-Pol Droit (ed.), La Compagnie Des 
Contemporains: Rencontres Avec Des Penseurs D'aujourd'hui (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002). 
30 Philippe Goulliaud and Guillaume Perrault, 'Marine Le Pen : «Je Suis La Candidate Antisystème»', Le Figaro (6 
April 2012). 
31 in ibid. 
32 Marine Le Pen, 'Discours De Clôture', Front National, Metz, 12 December 2011. 
33 Marine Le Pen, 'Grand Meeting Au Zénith', Front National, Paris, 17 April 2012, Marine Le Pen, 'Réunion 
Publique À Hénin-Beaumont', Front National, Hénin-Beaumont, 15 April 2012. 
34 Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no.4 2004, 542-63, Yves Mény and 
Yves Surel, 'The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism', in Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds.), Democracies and the 
Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
35 This understanding is based loosely on the so-called Essex school; for more detail see Ernesto Laclau, 
'Populism: What’s in a Name ?', in Francisco Panizza (ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London ; 
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represent the people does not have to rest on their sincere belief, but rather on a strategic 
move aiming at the creation of a people against various minorities, depending on time and 
place (immigrants, media, elite etc.). This embodiment of the people proved crucial to the 
FN as it provided it with what it had been denied since its creation and reinforced its 
credentials: a form of democratic legitimacy whereby the party no longer represented its 
marginal and discredited core supporters, but instead the people as a whole in a post-
democratic setting.36 This has been ultimately reinforced by disproportionate media 
coverage of the party’s performance since its creation. As demonstrated in Table 1, the 
‘Marine effect’ has not been as significant as commonly advertised when registered voters 
are taken into account,37 or as consequential as the hegemonic shift in political rhetoric. 
 
 
Table 1. The FN’s electoral progress since its creation  
(P: presidential elections; E: European elections; L: Legislative elections) 
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37 Aurelien Mondon, 'Nuancing the Right-Wing Populist Hype', Policy Network, 26 August 2014. Available on 
http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4719&title=Nuancing-the-right-wing-populist-hype  
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Besides this, the use of populist rhetoric alone as an answer to socio-economic issues 
was not enough to allow the return of the pariah; to effect a revival, adapting to the new 
framework of post-war politics was crucial. The main change was again rhetorical: the 
extreme right’s solutions were no longer based on crude racism but relied instead on neo-
racist rhetoric. 
b. Neo-racism: the acceptable face of the old pariah 
In early twentieth-century Europe, the Jews were the perfect target for exclusivist 
sentiment during times of crisis: they were denounced as stateless and cosmopolitan 
people, henceforth opposed to the nation, to the fatherland; they were ‘imaginary 
foreigners’.38 As with most types of exclusion, anti-Semitism, at times referred to as ‘the 
Socialism of the stupid’, was used as cement to bind the Nation against an enemy, an 
‘other’, a ‘Them’. Anti-Semitism was a decoy; it served to erase social differences, diverting 
the attention of workers from class struggle. After the Second World War, this type of 
racism became increasingly difficult to defend openly in western politics. While racism 
remained, it had to be hidden and the mainstream political discourse steered clear of crude 
racist references. While some mainstream politicians reassured the most radical parts of 
their electorate of their conservative credentials with the use of dog-whistle politics, these 
occurrences remained rare, and were often denounced by the majority of their colleagues 
to save face in the seemingly consensual post-racial society built on the ruins of the war. In 
this new context, the extreme right became unappealing and marginalised for much of the 
second part of the century. The lingering stigma of the Second World War and acclaimed 
policies of human rights and multiculturalism during post-war economic growth meant that 
their exclusionary discourse was out of touch with the population as a whole. With low 
unemployment rates, a strong economy and comprehensive welfare states, the lower-
middle classes, traditional supporters of the extreme right, felt at ease. While some rare 
extreme right pushes occurred, it was widely believed that its time had passed and its short-
lived and limited successes only represented the final bursts of a dying ideology.  
Yet such a reassuring understanding of racism and the extreme right leaves aside 
their potential for evolution and transformation, key to all ideas and ideologies. As 
previously noted, the FN and the influence of pioneering thinkers from the Nouvelle Droite 
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crafted and popularised in France a new kind of racism akin to that which the United 
Kingdom witnessed from the 1970s.39 This ‘new-racism’ did not rely on ‘biological heredity, 
but [on] the irreducibility of cultural differences’:40 it is not the ‘other’ who is to blame, but 
rather its effect on ‘us’ and ‘our’ society. While not racist in the traditional biological sense, 
neo-racism rests on the same essentialising tenets but offers one main advantage: ‘it allows 
for the transformation of traditional forms of racism into new forms of exclusion, less likely 
to lead to legal prosecution and/or to political discredit’.41 In rhetoric, contemporary 
exclusion is no longer based on natural superiorities and inferiorities, but on a different 
form of inequality: the innate and indelible incompatibility of cultures, at times even risking 
the ‘genocide’ of autochthon (to be understood western) cultures through submersion by 
aliens. Therefore, under a thin veneer of tolerance, neo-racists can express anti-immigrant 
sentiment based on the same innate and generalising elements central to traditional types 
of racism. This ideological tool became central to the hegemonic battle launched by the 
most radical parts of the right, and the FN in particular, to reclaim ‘common sense’.42 While 
its reach receded in the 1990s, neo-racism, allied with populist rhetoric, returned as a 
powerful political tool in the 2000s as growing parts of the population became disillusioned 
with the post-political situation, and the 9/11 attacks served as a convenient justification for 
the targeting of the Muslim population in both politics and the media.43 This led to the 
return of a ‘racism without racial support’,44 based on culture and ‘culturalism’,45 and often 
fuelled by populism and what Ruth Wodak has called the ‘arrogance of ignorance’.46 Those 
with a Muslim background became the new ‘imaginary foreigners’. 
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Therefore, like other political ideas, the limitation of racism to its original (and 
biological) form would be detrimental to the study of its contemporary forms. As previously 
mentioned, calling extreme right parties racist is counterproductive as it can be (and has 
been) easily refuted, further reinforcing their reputation as martyrs. Yet it would be wrong 
to assume that this rejection of biological racism means that the rhetoric and programme of 
parties such as the FN are not racist. It is in such settings that the concept of neo-racism 
becomes essential, as it makes a form of racism void of the biological idea of race possible. 
This process of transformation takes time and diligence, and, as the following section shows, 
the Le Pens’ efforts and patience took over forty years to be rewarded. 
 
3. A mainstreamed FN: The new meaning of the Republic 
 
To further its cause, neo-racism often distorts universalist and secularist arguments, 
which again separates it from traditional forms of racist politics. To be accepted, the Other 
must follow paradoxical rules whereby they are asked to downplay and eventually lose their 
originality and origins to fit within 'Our' tolerant and progressive societies. In France, it has 
been the idolised image of the Republic and its secularist foundation that have served as 
pawns in the legitimization of neo-racism and the vilification of Islam. 
a. Islam as the enemy 
 
While it is undeniable that Marine Le Pen has helped to moderate the image of the 
party,47 the 2012 presidential campaign demonstrated that it would be a mistake to assume 
that the FN had been mainstreamed and become a ‘normal’ contender for power. However, 
the party’s neo-racist vilification of minorities has been evident from the beginning of her 
leadership. One striking example took place six months after defeating the more radical 
Bruno Gollnisch in January 2011, when Marine Le Pen refused to alienate her base by 
standing against her father’s polemical comments in the wake of Anders Breivik’s terrorist 
attacks in Norway. For Jean-Marie Le Pen, what was most concerning in the attacks was not 
the terrorist threat emanating from the extreme right, but rather Norway’s naivety prior to 
the attacks.48 Marine Le Pen refused to denounce her father’s comments and instead 
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declared that she was ‘not in disagreement’ with him on this point,49 a wording which 
demonstrated the uneasiness of the new leader, and yet the impossibility to break away 
from what had made the party an alternative for 40 years. In contrast to the FN’s 
description of the Utøya massacre, the Toulouse and Montauban terrorist attacks in March 
2012 ‘were not the result of a madman’s action, but the start of green fascism in our 
country’.50 The term ‘madman’, used in both cases demonstrated that terroristic violence 
was only a calculated threat when its basis was found in Islam. Despite Breivik’s incredibly 
detailed and planned ideological trajectory, his actions did not represent a crisis for the FN, 
but were merely accidental. On the other hand, Merah was not a madman, he was not even 
an individual; he was a symbol, a synecdoche: Islam. Turning history on its head, as many 
had before with flawed comparisons to the 1930s and 1940s,51 Marine Le Pen described 
herself as the resistant against ‘green fascism’,52 the one who would take up the war the 
state had lost against the barbarous invaders from the suburbs who ‘want to put France on 
its knees’. For Le Pen, the shootings demonstrated that ‘the risk of fundamentalism [had] 
been underestimated in France’.53 Adding to the already pervasive suspicion of Islam, Le Pen 
warned of a ‘war against politico-religious fundamentalists who kill our Christian sons, our 
young Christian men, our young Muslim men and Jewish children’. As she promoted the 
return of the death penalty in a France traumatised by the recent events,54 she felt 
confident to claim days before the election that it was natural for the French ‘to no longer 
want French-Algerians like Merah’ in their country.55 
During the campaign, Le Pen’s neo-racist attacks on the Muslim population made it 
clear that her moderate stance was little more than a façade.56 Early on, she created a storm 
by claiming that 100 per cent of the meat sold around Paris was halal.57 While she never 
divulged the proofs she claimed to hold, this added to the stigma attached to the Muslim 
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population in the same manner anti-Semites created suspicions about the Jewish 
community at the turn of the twentieth century. Le Pen played on the belief that Islam was 
insidiously taking over France and had in fact already colonised our plates, imposing their 
religious practice on our daily habits. To counter this ‘invasion’, Le Pen stated in an 
authoritarian manner that with her election ‘street prayers ... would come to an end’ and 
that, if she was to be elected, ‘intégristes’ would face, for the first time in decades, ‘an 
extremely determined power’.58 Here again, Le Pen linked various elements of Islam into a 
one-size-fits-all demonisation of anyone associated with this religion, by creed, ethnic 
background, name or origin. While the link was never clearly stated, in this conception 
relatively innocuous or rare occurrences such as halal food, street prayers and mosques all 
eventually led to extreme Islamism. Even though her critique of Islam went directly against 
the principles of the law of 1905 which guarantees the free exercise of religion (1st article) 
and its public aspect (25th article), Le Pen claimed as early as 2010 to be the defender of 
secularism against the ‘occupation’.59 In September 2012, the invasion scare was reiterated 
by her father who declared during the FN conference that the presence of ‘two hundred 
million Muslims at our doors, south of the Mediterranean, is a serious threat’.60 This time, it 
was no longer extremists within the Muslim community which were a threat, but Muslims in 
general. 
Despite the party’s extreme and neo-racist behaviour towards Islam in particular, the 
FN appeared ever more respectable. In November 2011, polls highlighted that FN 
supporters had become more comfortable with admitting their support for the party, 
breaking away from what used to be considered a shameful act.61 In early 2012, a TNS Sofres 
survey confirmed that a record 31 per cent of respondents agreed with FN ideas and that 
only 35 per cent entirely rejected them,62 striking figures compared to those recorded by 
Jean-Marie Le Pen throughout his career. In the north of France, where the FN has 
                                                     
58 Abel Mestre, 'Marine Le Pen Prend Pour Cible Les "Intégristes" Au Nom De La Laïcité', Le Monde, 15 January 
2012. 
59 Jean Baubérot, La Laïcité Falsifiée, (Paris: La Découverte, 2012), pp.16;50-62. 
60 Jean-Marie Le Pen, 'UDT 2012 - La Baule : Intervention De Jean-Marie Le Pen', Front National,  23 September 
2013. 
61 Thomas Wieder, 'Les Électeurs Fn Sont Plus Nombreux À Assumer Leur Vote', Le Monde, 19 November 2011. 
62 Le Monde, France Info and Canal +, Baromètre d'image du Front national : Janvier 2012 (TNS Sofres,  2012). 
Available on 
http://www.franceinfo.fr/sites/default/files/2012/01/11/495063/pdf/fichier/Sondage%20TNS%20Sofres%20Fr
ance%20Info%20Le%20Monde%20Canal%20%2B%20%20la%20p%C3%A9n%C3%A9tration%20des%20id%C3%
A9es%20du%20FN.pdf 
 17 
 
traditionally been successful, up to 40 per cent declared having a good opinion of Le Pen 
and 70 per cent felt it was a party like any other.63 Her defeat in the election has in no way 
reversed the trend and recent polls suggest that even though a strong majority of 
respondents still had a ‘bad opinion’ of Le Pen (65 per cent), her popularity was increasing 
dramatically amongst right-wing supporters (from 34 per cent in 2011 to 56 per cent in 
2012).64 Similarly, a more recent BVA poll suggested that although the results of the 2014 
European elections were ‘worrying’ for 65 per cent of respondents, 53 per cent believed the 
FN should be considered a ‘party like any other’.65 After five years of Sarkozist presidency 
and the constant and overt pandering of the mainstream right to extreme right supporters,66 
the lines had clearly shifted in France and concepts central to French politics, such as the 
Republic and secularism, have been redefined to suit the new political paradigm. 
b. The secular hypocrisy 
 
While it has been detailed elsewhere that the mainstream right has both benefited 
from and helped the extreme right in its process of mainstreaming,67 it is interesting for the 
purposes of this article to explore the reaction to the law allowing same-sex marriage in 
France, in light of the aforementioned hegemonic struggle. While Marine Le Pen remained 
silent during the 2013 demonstrations against same-sex marriage, her party played a 
prominent part in them, with leading figures standing at the front of the march.68 Beyond 
the FN’s failure to break loose from its roots, these events also showed the newfound 
confidence in the most reactionary circles in France and their unexpected ability to gain 
momentum.  
Yet, for this article, these events are particularly interesting in the context of the 
hegemonic rise of an exclusivist understanding of the concepts of the Republic, and more 
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particularly one of its cornerstones, one with purposefully fuzzy and multiple meanings: 
secularism or laïcité.69 While its original aims, as stated in the 1st article of the 1905 law on 
the separation of Church and State, order the Republic to ensure ‘freedom of conscience 
[and] guarantee freedom of worship limited only by the following rules in the interest of 
public order’,70 a new understanding aimed directly at the singularising and stigmatising of 
Islam took clear precedence in the 2000s.71 To understand the importance of the recent 
demonstrations against same-sex marriage in France in explaining the hegemony of neo-
racism, the 2004 law on religious symbols in public schools and the 2010 law banning the 
dissimulation of the face in public space must be discussed briefly.  
In 2004, the French government banned the wearing of ‘conspicuous’ religious 
symbols in public schools. As John Bowen highlighted, ‘although worded in a religion-neutral 
way, everyone understood the law to be aimed at keeping Muslim girls from wearing 
headscarves in schools’.72 Some opponents of the law argued that it stood against the very 
values of the Republic: it was discriminatory as it was aimed at a particular kind of students 
whose religious habits were perceived as threatening.73 In fact, those who were obliged to 
wear these oppressive religious symbols would risk further alienation if they were removed 
from schools as a result. Those who had made their own free choice to wear such symbols, 
on the other hand, would find that the promise of liberty, equality and fraternity only 
applied once they gave up on their individuality and free will. In 2010, the government went 
further, passing a law clearly directed against the burqa, with Sarkozy himself stating that 
‘we cannot accept in our country women imprisoned behind a fence … this is not the idea 
the French Republic has of women’s dignity’.74 In times of economic crisis, high 
unemployment and social unrest, this issue was prominent in the media and high on 
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politicians’ agenda, even though the French government services themselves had noted that 
only 367 women wore the burqa in France.75 Apart from the inaudible opposition of those 
affected by the law and a handful of their supporters,76 both laws were passed in a most 
consensual manner, satisfying most from the extreme right to the extreme left, albeit for 
different reasons.77 For most politicians and commentators, such developments were in line 
with the emancipatory mission of the Republic: for Eric Besson, then minister of 
immigration and national identity, the 2010 law would allow ‘life in society and civilisation 
to be explained’ to those victims.78 For the minister, subscribing to Islam could no longer be 
considered a question of agency: it meant being under the power of a sexist, violent, 
uncivilised community – women became the ‘pawns of heritage politics’.79 Hajjat and 
Mohammed describe the discourse around new secularism as ‘revealing of the will to 
discipline bodies and minds: the bodies and minds of Muslims are undisciplined, they refuse 
to adapt to ‘republican’ mental structures and must be subjected to a particular form of 
discipline’.80 
Yet, beyond the inconsistencies highlighted by many scholars,81 it took the recent 
demonstrations against the law authorising same-sex marriage to fully uncover the extent of 
the French secular hypocrisy. On the 13th of January 2013, 340,000 demonstrators took to 
the Paris streets to protest against new legislation on same-sex marriage. The two main 
umbrella organisations were Manif’ pour tous (Demo’ for all - MPT) led by Virginie Merle, 
better known under the pseudonym Frigide Barjot, self-proclaimed ‘press secretary for 
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Jesus’,82 and Printemps Français (French Spring - PF). Officially, neither organisation cited 
religious concerns to justify their radical position against the law. In their manifesto, PF 
described its fight ‘against the programmed rupture of civilisation’, for ‘justice and 
solidarity’ and to support ‘the weakest, the poor, and those without rights’; nowhere is 
homosexuality even mentioned.83 Similarly, MPT claims to be ‘a movement of free citizens, 
non-partisan, non-confessional, plural and diverse’.84 However, the religious affiliations of 
these ‘movements’ are obvious through their leaders’ background and informal rhetoric. PF, 
the more radical of the two, is supported by ultra-Catholic groups, often with close links to 
the extreme right.85 While MPT appears more moderate, it also has links to extreme right 
formations such as Secours de France.86 While these links could have demonstrated the 
broad reach of the movements, a Le Monde investigation demonstrated that out of the 37 
associations taking part in the Manif’ pour Tous, 22 are ‘empty vessels’ and most of the 
others are linked to religious movements (mostly Christian).87  
Far from being ‘for all’ as the MPT’s name suggests, the movements are clearly 
exclusive of those in favour of the law. Therefore, this leads to a particularly violent 
assessment of their purpose: if those who are not part of the demonstrations are not part of 
the ‘all’, then they are the ‘other’, excluded from the demos and thus from democracy. Just 
as violent, the name French Spring suggests that opponents to this group are classified 
alongside the tyrannical governments overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt and Lybia. Furthermore, 
beyond its visible presence in the streets, this radical understanding of society based on a 
religious vision of the family has infiltrated the Assemblée Nationale,88 and gained the 
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support of prominent figures, in contrast with the teenagers wearing hijabs or women 
wearing burqas, who were argued to pose a threat to the survival of the secular Republic. 
The language of politicians supporting the movements posed a clear threat to the Republic: 
Christine Boutin, president of the Christian-Democrat party and former minister under 
Nicolas Sarkozy, made it clear that if the government does not offer ‘strong and symbolic 
measures – that is the withdrawal of the bill’ – ‘it will blow up’.89 As noted by RMC journalist 
Jean-Jacques Bourdin in reaction to her comments, Boutin ‘threatened to topple the 
Republic’, as she insinuated that violence would be justified if François Hollande did not 
renege on a campaign promise. During the debates, some parliamentarians were 
threatened,90 and since then, homophobic attacks have increased in France91 and 
homosexuality considered less acceptable than in 2007.92  
The fervent secularism exhibited during the 2004 hijab and 2010 burqa affairs, and 
the ‘holy secular alliance between once-opposed political trends’,93 would suggest that the 
sudden media prominence of a religious movement in France, the violence of its message 
and its infiltration of the highest political bodies would have created a backlash amongst 
French secular republicans. However, while many opposed the demonstrations, it was never 
considered that the threat posed by PF and MPT was a danger to the Republic and 
secularism. Nor was some members’ extreme behaviour generalised to the entire Christian 
population in France. In the new France, it has become natural to impose double standards 
in regards to Islam, particularly as those associated with it, willingly or not, become more 
assertive with their rights as French citizens. As Olivier Roy mentioned in 2005 already, ‘the 
defence of laïcité is more than ever that of an identity which has trouble defining itself 
positively’.94 
Conclusion: a new normal? 
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En France', Le Monde. 06 June 2013. Available on http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/06/06/l-
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As France continues to struggle to emerge from the crisis, and unemployment fails to 
recede, the FN alternative seems bound to remain popular into the near future, as proven 
by its victory in the 2014 European elections. While they are second-order elections and do 
not necessarily prefigure a rise in the polls in major elections, they are a symbol of the 
growing acceptance of ideas which were until recently widely rejected as undemocratic and 
unrepublican. In January 2014, and for the second consecutive year, a CEVIPOF, Le Monde 
and Fondation Jean-Jaurès poll highlighted the growing tensions within French society.95 
Many results demonstrated respondents’ negative views of their society and the future, 
creating thereby a fertile ground for the FN: 85 per cent of respondents believed that France 
is in decline, playing into the hands of the regeneration thesis typical of the extreme right. 
84 per cent felt that politicians ‘mostly act in their own interest’ and 78 per cent that the 
‘democratic system’ does not function well and that ‘their ideas are not well represented’. 
84 per cent believed a ‘real leader’ was needed to ‘restore order’, and 45 per cent that the 
death penalty should be restored. Respondents were overwhelmingly nostalgic, with 74 per 
cent declaring that ‘in France, it was better before’. While the polls quoted above showed 
that homosexuality has become less accepted in France, it is Islam which, unsurprisingly, 
appears as the main threat, with 63 per cent of respondents believing that it is incompatible 
with the ‘values of the French society’ (compared to 24% for Judaism and 9% for 
Catholicism).96 Research on the French Muslim population, which has demonstrated that, on 
many accounts, French Muslims were as, if not more, loyal to the values of the French 
Republic than a random sample of French citizens,97 has held little value in the face of what 
has become a common-sense suspicion of Islam, and anyone related to it.  
In this new political paradigm, it is now common to see prominent commentators 
(‘taboo-breakers’) predict, without even a semblance of evidence, the disappearance of 
western culture and the worldwide imposition of minority rights, be they embodied in gay 
rights or Sharia law.98 This was exemplified by Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent return to politics. 
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96 Ibid. 
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98 Sebastien Fontenelle, Les Briseurs De Tabous, (Paris: La Decouverte, 2012), Pascal Boniface, Les Intellectuels 
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While pretending to incarnate the solution to France’s divided society, the former president 
made it clear that his strategy would remain couched in populist and ethno-exclusivist terms 
to appeal to the FN’s electorate. With regards to same-sex marriage legislation and the 
demonstrations that ensued, Sarkozy declared that he would not ‘use families against 
homosexuals, the way homosexuals were used against families’.99 This statement 
epitomised the new hegemonic paradigm wherein a deeply anti-egalitarian proposition 
(homosexuals cannot make up families) is couched in uniting terms (‘I respect both camps, 
but they will be kept separate’). In early October, the former president went further, stating 
that, ‘to bring the French together on common values’, he would recommend a 
constitutional amendment to limit medically assisted procreation techniques to infertile 
heterosexual couples and ban surrogacy altogether.100 Following in Sarkozy’s footsteps, and 
a few days before a new Manif’ pour Tous event,101 the Socialist Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
pandered to the right-wing conservative movement, declaring his strong opposition to 
surrogacy in the catholic newspaper La Croix.102 In 2014, homosexual couples had become 
yet another ‘other’, despite polls indicating that a majority of respondents accept 
homosexual families as legitimate.103 While surrogacy for homosexual couples remains a 
divisive issue (with a majority of respondents declaring their opposition), a majority of left-
wing sympathisers are supportive, highlighting further the Parti Socialiste’s decision to move 
rightward against the interests of its traditional electorate. 
As shown through these examples, neo-racism and the associated right-wing 
populist rhetoric have become unavoidable in mainstream electoral politics, and a similar 
pattern can be witnessed beyond French borders. As the world faces crisis after crisis, the 
appeal of exclusion and prejudice will doubtless continue to rise. Many politicians will not 
resist the simplicity of drawing on the fears of a growing disillusioned electorate. As 
abstention increases in most western countries, it has become ever clearer that a growing 
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100 Nicolas Sarkozy, «Je veux redonner de l'espoir», Le Figaro, 2 October 2014, available on 
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part of the population no longer believes in the solutions offered by the mainstream left and 
right. With a left still in shambles and failing to put forward a positive and/or appealing 
alternative, the growth of dystopian movements appears unavoidable. While it is important 
to remain cold-headed and not be overly alarmist, it is clear that prejudice and exclusion can 
be stirred, and racism can become a powerful weapon in a society where growing parts of 
the population feel justly threatened and insecure.  
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